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Charles L. Babcock* and Bryan C. Collins**
I. ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
A. Open Records Act
ECORDS relating to football recruiting continued to be a prime bat-
tleground under the Open Records Act during the last Survey pe-
riod. I The Fifth Circuit, in Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association,2 reversed the district court's ruling,3 which held that the Texas
Open Records Act applied to the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) and the Southwest Athletic Conference (SWC). The district court
held that the records maintained by these agencies should, in large part, be
released to three news organizations. 4 These three organizations included
WFAA-TV, Channel 8 in Dallas, the Dallas Times Herald, and the Dallas
Morning News. The NCAA and SWC both contended that they did not
receive public funds from the State of Texas and, therefore, were not govern-
mental bodies under the Open Records Act.' The Fifth Circuit reversed the
decision, but affirmed the district court's finding that both the NCAA and
SWC received public funds from the State of Texas. 6 The appellate court,
however, disagreed with the district judge's finding that these public funds
paid to the NCAA and SWC were used for their general support. 7 The Fifth
Circuit reversed this fact finding and found that the public funds were attrib-
utable to a specific payment for specific measurable services., Relying on
two opinions of the Texas attorney general, 9 the Fifth Circuit ruled that the
* A.B., Brown University; J.D., Boston University. Attorney at Law, Jackson &
Walker, Dallas, Texas.
** A.B., Stanford University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Jackson &
Walker, Dallas, Texas.
1. See Babcock & Collins, Local Government Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law 42 Sw.
L.J. 661 (1988).
2. 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988).
3. Id. at 231.
4. 650 F. Supp. 1076, 1090 (W.D. Tex. 1986).
5. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 2(1)(F) (Vernon Supp. 1989) defines
"Governmental body" as "the part, section, or portion of every organization, corporation,
commission, committee, institution or agency which is supported in whole or in part by public
funds, or which expends public funds. Public funds as used herein shall mean funds of the
State of Texas or any governmental subdivision thereof ... 
6. 850 F.2d at 228.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 230.
9. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. ORD 228 (1979) and TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-343 (1982).
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athletic organizations were not subject to the Act and reversed the district
court. 10 Despite the fact that the Texas attorney general filed an amicus
curiae brief that quarrelled with the Fifth Circuit's analysis, the court denied
a motion for rehearing. I I The United States Supreme Court denied an appli-
cation for writ of certiorari.' 2
Football recruiting records were also before the court in Vandiver v. Star-
Telegram, Inc.13 In that case the Fort Worth Star- Telegram filed an applica-
tion for writ of mandamus in the district court seeking to require the presi-
dent of Texas A & M University to furnish records concerning the
recruitment of high school athlete Kevin Murray. The district court granted
the newspaper's motion for summary judgment and issued the writ of man-
damus. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed. '4 The appellate court based
its decision on the presumption found in section 7(a) of the Open Records
Act that requires a governmental body wishing to withhold information pur-
suant to the Act to seek an opinion from the Texas attorney general.'
5
Texas A & M, the governmental body in this case, did not request an attor-
ney general ruling, but merely informed the newspaper that the information
was not public. The Austin Court of Appeals held that under those circum-
stances the information sought was presumed public. 16 Furthermore, the
court held that all fact findings would be construed against the governmental
body at summary judgment unless the governmental body produced some
summary judgment proof that would bring the information within one of the
exceptions of the Act. 17
Similarly, in Creel v. Sheriff of Medina County 18 the court considered the
section 7(a) presumption that the information was public. In that case,
Creel, an inmate in the Texas Department of Corrections, requested infor-
mation pursuant to section 4 of the Open Records Act.19 The sheriff and
10. 850 F.2d at 231.
11. 856 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1988).
12. 109 S. Ct. 868 (1989).
13. 756 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
14. Id. at 107.
15. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 7(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) states:
If a governmental body receives a written request for information which it con-
siders within one of the exceptions stated in Section 3 of this Act, but there has
been no previous determination that it falls within one of the exceptions, the
governmental body within a reasonable time, no later than ten days, after receiv-
ing a written request must request a decision from the attorney general to deter-
mine whether the information is within that exception. If a decision is not so
requested, the information shall be presumed to be public information.
16. 756 S.W.2d at 106.
17. Id. at 106-07.
18. 751 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
19. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1989) states:
On application for public information to the custodian of information in a gov-
ernmental body by any person, the custodian shall promptly produce such infor-
mation for inspection or duplication, or both, in the offices of the governmental
body. If the information is in active use or in storage and, therefore, not avail-
able at the time a person asks to examine it, the custodian shall certify this fact
in writing to the applicant and set a date and hour within a reasonable time
when the record will be available for the exercise of the right given by this Act.
Nothing in this Act shall authorize any person to remove original copies of pub-
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district attorney of Medina County denied the request, relying on sections
3(a)(1), 3(a)(3) and 3(a)(8) of the Act.20 In denying the request, however,
the governmental bodies did not seek an opinion from the attorney general.
Absent a request, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the informa-
tion could be presumed to be public. 2 1 The governmental bodies argued that
since Creel had already seen the records, a writ of mandamus was unneces-
sary. The court of appeals, however, held that this fact did not overcome the
section 7(a) presumption. 22
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Klein In-
dependent School District v. Mattox23 decided an important case under the
Texas Open Records Act and under the Federal Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act.24 In that case a teacher in the Klein Independent School
District filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court that sought a
ruling that disclosure of the teacher's college transcript would violate her
right to privacy under the Federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act and the first amendment. Since she was not a student, the district court
dismissed the case on the grounds that her college transcript was not an
educational record that would have been protected from disclosure under
the Federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. The court of ap-
peals agreed with the lower court's holding that even if a privacy interest
existed in the college transcript, the interest of the public to inquire into a
teacher's credentials outweighed the teacher's individual privacy interests.25
Based on this balancing test, the Fifth Circuit held that this information
could be released under the Open Records Act.26 The court of appeals did
recognize, however, that the Act does make provisions for safeguarding the
privacy of an individual. 27 In this case, however, these safeguards were not
applicable because of the competing public interest. The court reasoned that
the public disclosure of a teacher's academic record did not create an unwar-
ranted infringement upon that teacher's privacy and that a teacher's right to
lic records from the offices of any governmental body without the written per-
mission of the custodian of the records.
20. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, §§ 3(a)(1), (3), (8) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
Section 3(a)(l) exempts information from disclosure that is deemed confidential by constitu-
tional or statutory law, or by judicial decision. Section 3(a)(3) exempts:
information relating to litigation of a criminal or civil nature and settlement
negotiations, to which the state or political subdivision is, or may be, a party, or
to which an officer or employee of the state or political subdivision, as a conse-
quence of his office or employment, is or may be a party, that the attorney gen-
eral or the respective attorneys of the various political subdivisions has
determined should be withheld from public inspection ....
Section 3(a)(8) permits an agency to decline to disclose "records of law enforcement agencies
and prosecutors that deal wit the detection, investigation, and prosecution of crime and the
internal records and notations of such law enforcement agencies and prosecutors which are
maintained for internal use in matters relating to law enforcement and prosecution .
21. 751 S.W.2d at 647.
22. Id.
23. 830 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1987).
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1982).
25. 830 F.2d at 578.




privacy was outweighed by the public's right to know. 28
B. Open Meetings Act
In addition to the cases decided under the Open Records Act, there was
also substantial litigation concerning the Open Meetings Act.29 In Sierra
Club v. Austin Transportation Study Policy Advisory Committee30 the court
decided whether the Austin Transportation Study Policy Advisory Commit-
tee (ATSPAC) was subject to the Open Meetings Act. The ATSPAC was a
committee made up of government officials responsible for drafting certain
transportation planning documents for submission to the federal govern-
ment. The trial court ruled that ATSPAC was not required to comply with
the Act, but this decision was reversed by the Austin court of appeals. 3 1 The
appellate court noted that the language of the Open Meetings Act reveals the
legislative intent to give it broad coverage and that ATSPAC was therefore
subject to the Act. 32 The court based its decision on the fact that ATSPAC
was a seventeen-member body made up of state, county, regional, and mu-
nicipal public officials. Further, ATSPAC's decisions affected Travis,
Hayes, Caldwell, Bastrop, and Williamson Counties' highway planning, and
federal law previously designated ATSPAC as a metropolitan planning
organization.
The Austin court of appeals recognized that when the Open Meetings Act
was passed in 1967, committees similar to ATSPAC did not exist.33 The
court, however, noted that section 1 (c) of the Act included governing boards
of special districts that had not yet been created.34 The court found that
ATSPAC was a special district and therefore a governmental body within
the meaning of the Open Meetings Act.35 The court held that ATSPAC was
subject to the Open Meetings Act because of the fact that ATSPAC pro-
vided benefits and improvements local in nature and brought federal high-
way funds into the Austin urban area for highway planning and
construction. 36
City of Fort Worth v. Groves 37 involved a trial court ruling that voided an
28. Id.
29. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
30. 746 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
31. Id. at 301.
32. Id. at 300.
33. Id. at 301.
34. Id. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § l(c) (Vernon Supp. 1989) states:
As used in this Act: . . . 'Governmental body' means any board, commission,
department, committee, or agency within the executive or legislative department
of the state, which is under the direction of one or more elected or appointed
members; and every Commissioners Court and city council in the state, and
every deliberative body having rule-making or quasi-judicial power and classi-
fied as a department, agency, or political subdivision of a county or city; and the
board of trustees of every school district, and every county board of school trust-
ees and county board of education; and the governing board of every special dis-
trict heretofore or hereafter created by law." (emphasis added).
35. 746 S.W.2d at 301.
36. Id.
37. 746 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
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agreement between Tarrant County and the city of Fort Worth. In the
agreement Tarrant County leased the Tarrant County Convention Center to
the city of Fort Worth for $30.00. The trial court voided the agreement
because of Tarrant County's failure to comply with the Open Meetings Act.
The Fort Worth court of appeals, sitting en banc, sustained the trial court's
determination that the lease was void on the grounds that it violated the
Open Meetings Act.38 The court first found that the plaintiff had standing
to bring an action under the Open Meetings Act.39 The court held that the
individual citizens should serve as a guide, by voicing their opinions to gov-
ernment bodies such as the commissioner's court, and should be given the
chance to hear and be heard. 4° The court did note, however, that it was not
likely that the legislature intended to allow just anybody to have their day in
court, and limited this group of people to only those who had standing.41
The court recognized that while it was easy to determine standing when the
government has injured someone in the tort or breach of contract context, it
was difficult to determine standing in the breach of notice requirement con-
text.42 In the original Open Meetings Act, the court noted, the plaintiff
would be limited to remedies either by mandamus or injunction. 43 Under
section 3a of the new Open Meetings Act, however, an action becomes void-
able if the government is in violation of the requirement. 44
The court then turned to the issue of whether the county had complied
with the Open Meetings Act. The notice requirements of the Act provide
that notice of a meeting must be posted in a place readily accessible to the
public at all times seventy-two hours prior to the meeting.45 In this case the
38. Id. at 915.
39. Id.




44. Id. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) allows "any
interested person, including bona fide members of the news media, [to] commence an action
either by mandamus or injunctions for the purpose of stopping, preventing, or reversing viola-
tions or threatened violations of this Act by members of a governing body. An action taken by
a governmental body in violation of this Act is voidable."
45. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3A(h) (Vernon Supp. 1989). The
new provision provides:
Notice of a meeting must be posted in a place readily accessible to the general
public at all times for at least 72 hours preceding the scheduled time of the
meeting, except that notice of a meeting of a state board, commission, depart-
ment, or officer having statewide jurisdiction, other than the Industrial Accident
Board or the governing board of an institution of higher education, must be
posted by the Secretary of State for at least seven days preceding the day of the
meeting. In case of emergency public necessity, which shall be clearly identified
in the notice, it shall be sufficient if the notice is posted two hours before the
meeting is convened. Any public official or person who is designated or author-
ized to post notices of meetings by a governmental body in accordance with
Section 3A of this Act shall post the notice taking at face value the reason for
the emergency as stated by the governmental body. Cases of emergency and
urgent public necessity are limited to imminent threats to public health and
safety or reasonably unforeseeable situations requiring immediate action by the
governmental body. Provided further, that where a meeting has been called
with notice thereof posted in accordance with this subsection, additional sub-
1989]
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notice was posted in the basement of the Tarrant County Courthouse, but
the seventy-two-hour period in this case spanned only nights and a weekend.
Moreover, the notice was not available for public inspection because access
to the basement during nights and weekends was granted only by the secur-
ity guard. This security guard was unavailable, many times, to respond to
requests by the public. Since the notice requirements were not fully com-
plied with, the Fort Worth court of appeals held that the Act had been vio-
lated.46 The trial court also awarded attorneys' fees for obtaining a
declaratory judgment with respect to the Open Meetings Act violation. The
Fort Worth court of appeals found that the award was reasonable and af-
firmed the lower court's decision. 47
In Bells v. Greater Texoma Utility Authority48 the Dallas court of appeals
vacated the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the case on the
grounds that the governmental plaintiff had failed to comply with the Open
Meetings Act by not properly giving notice of its meeting that authorized
counsel to file suit.49 The governmental body defended the appeal on the
basis that it had substantially complied with the notice provisions of the Act.
The Dallas court of appeals, however, found that substantial compliance is
not sufficient and that literal compliance is required under the Act.50 The
court went on to hold that since the Greater Texoma Utility Authority did
not literally comply with the Act, actions taken were subject to invalidation
by the court.5' A similar result was reached in Gulf Regional Education
Television Affiliates v. University of Houston 52 where the Houston court of
appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit because the governmental body had
not complied with the Open Meetings Act when it hired counsel and author-
ized suit.53
Three important cases decided by district courts during the Survey period
are all pending before appellate courts. The first case, The Dallas Morning
jects may be added to the agenda for such meeting by posting a supplemental
notice, in which the emergency or urgent public necessity requiring considera-
tion of such additional subjects is expressed. In the event of an emergency meet-
ing, or in the event any subject is added to the agenda in a supplemental notice
posted for a meeting other than an emergency meeting, it shall be sufficient if the
notice or supplemental notice is posted two hours before the meeting is con-
vened, and the presiding officer or the member calling such emergency meeting
or posting supplemental notice to the agenda for any other meeting shall, if
request therefor containing all pertinent information has previously been filed at
the headquarters of the governmental body, give notice by telephone or tele-
graph to any news media requesting such notice and consenting to pay any and
all expenses incurred by the governmental body in providing such special notice.
The notice provisions for legislative committee meetings shall be as provided by
the rules of the house and senate.
Id.
46. 746 S.W.2d at 915.
47. Id.
48. 744 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
49. Id. at 640.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 746 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
53. Id. at 809.
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News Company v. Bill Long, District Clerk, Dallas County, Texas,54 was a
declaratory judgment action. This action was brought by the Dallas Morn-
ing News, which sought to invalidate Dallas Civil District Court Rule 1.3355
as a violation of the first amendment to the United States Constitution, 56
article I, sections 8 and 13 of the Texas Constitution,57 as well as the com-
mon law.
In an unpublished opinion, District Judge John Marshall declared that the
rule was not violative of the public's common law right of access to public
records. The court held, however, that there were additional requirements
beyond the provisions of rule 1.33.58 The court ordered that the judgments
and orders that attempted to limit public access to court records must in-
clude a good cause explanation.59 Further, only necessary portions of the
document shall be sealed while the remaining portions must continue to be
accessible to the public. 6°
The district court declined to find that the rule violated any of the consti-
tutional provisions cited by the Morning News. 61 The newspaper appealed,
claiming that the trial court erred in failing to enter a declaratory judgment
ruling that the Texas Constitution, the United States Constitution, and the
common law all required civil court records to remain open for public in-
spection. The Morning News also claimed that court documents may be
sealed only if: (1) the public and press are given adequate notice of a hearing
and the opportunity to be heard before a court rules on whether a record
must be sealed; (2) a party shows "most compelling reasons" why the record
must be sealed so that the greater interest may be protected; and (3) sealing
54. CA 88-6107, 14th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas.
55. DALLAS Civ. DIST. CT. R. 1.33 provides:
Any party or his attorney may obtain an order for the suppression of any plead-
ing filed in any action by filing a petition with the Court in which the action is
filed showing good cause for such suppression. No person except the parties to
an action or their attorneys shall examine or publish, in whole or in part, any
papers so suppressed until such action, or some phase shall be heard in open
court or upon the order of the court. Upon the entry of a suppression order, the
Clerk shall suppress all papers filed in such action and shall prevent all persons,
except those herein designated, from having access thereto.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
57. TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 13 provide:
Sec. 8. Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions
on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall
ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. In prosecutions
for the publication of papers, investigating the conduct of officers, or men in
public capacity, or when the matter published is proper for public information,
the truth thereof may be given in evidence. And in all indictments for libels, the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction
of the court, as in other cases.
Sec. 13. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every per-
son for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law.
58. CA 88-6107; see supra note 54.
59. Id.





the court record is the least restrictive method of protecting the greater
interest. 62
The second of the three most important cases at the district court level
dealing with sealed recordings was Jimenez v. Fernandez.63 This case was
brought before the 131st Judicial District Court of Bexar County. In this
case, a judgment entered on September 16, 1988, stated that all records and
pleadings in the case would be sealed. The lawsuit was filed May 4, 1988,
after Federico Fernandez, a Franciscan friar and former parish priest in San
Antonio, was indicted on two criminal counts of indecency with a child.
The plaintiffs alleged that the minor plaintiffs and their brother had been
victims of the priest's sexual perversions and sought damages of $6 million
from the three named defendants. On September 28, 1988, the Express
News Corporation, publisher of the San Antonio Express News, filed a plea in
intervention and motion in relation to the sealed court records. The Express
News Corporation also moved that free access should be given to all docu-
ments, pleadings, and agreements filed in the case. The district court judge,
the Honorable Carolyn Spears, granted the Franciscan Friars of the Chi-
cago, St. Louis Province of Sacred Heart's motion to strike the intervention.
A motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus was filed with the
San Antonio court of appeals and is pending. 64
The final case, Chapman v. Maddox,65 deals with whether the disclosure
of college transcripts of professional school employees is required or pre-
vented under the Texas Open Records Act. The trial court prohibited the
Texas attorney general from ruling upon a request by the Houston Chronicle
on this issue until completion of the regular session of the Seventy-First
Texas Legislature. 66 The Houston Chronicle Publishing Company, pub-
lisher of the Houston Chronicle, filed a motion for leave to file petition for
writ of mandamus against the attorney general and the trial judge requesting
that the lower court ruling be overruled and that the attorney general be
required to issue an opinion. 67 The court granted the motion for leave, and
the case is currently pending before the Texas Supreme Court.
C. Attorney General Opinions Under The Open Records Act
The following attorney general decisions deal exclusively with requests for
information under the Texas Open Records Act.
ORD-481. This opinion dealt with whether the Airport Board could law-
fully have denied an unsuccessful applicant's request to review records con-
cerning his application for employment with the Dallas/Fort Worth
62. Brief of Appellant Dallas Morning News in No. 05-88-01131-CV, Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Supreme Judicial District of Texas, October 20, 1988.
63. CA 88CA-07960, 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas.
64. The Express-News Corp. v. Spears, No. 04-88-00526-CV, Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Supreme Judicial District of Texas, October 13, 1988.
65. CA 88-24250, 152nd Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas.
66. Order dated August 15, 1988, CA 88-24250, 152nd Judicial District Court, Harris
County, Texas.
67. C-791 1, in Supreme Court of Texas.
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International Airport.68 The first type of information at issue was financial
information concerning the applicant and his wife. The attorney general
held that while a privacy interest might be implicated, it was unclear whose
privacy the Airport Board was attempting to protect. 69 The attorney gen-
eral held that the privacy of the person furnishing the information (a finan-
cial institution in this case) was not implicated because there was no
constitutionally protected privacy interest absent highly intimate or embar-
rassing information. 70 The attorney general also held that privacy rights
were not implicated when the governmental body was asked to furnish infor-
mation about the person who actually requested such information. 71
The opinion then turned to whether the Airport Board must release a
polygraph examination that was taken by the applicant. The attorney gen-
eral held that the Airport Board may release the report, but is not required
to do So.7 2 The next type of information requested was a psychological eval-
uation of the applicant. The attorney general found that the report consisted
entirely of an opinion and recommendation of the psychologist and therefore
could be withheld under section 3(a)(1 1) of the Act.73 The next type of
information at issue was a checklist that contained reasons why the Airport
Board denied employment to the applicant. With one exception, the attor-
ney general held that this information must be released. 74 The attorney gen-
eral held that a document indicating the Board's agreement or disagreement
regarding the applicant could be withheld under the section 3(a)(1 1) recom-
mendation exception.75 A document regarding background checks on the
applicant must, however, be disclosed.76
ORD-482. This request produced two important rulings from the attorney
general. 77 The first was that physician-created or physician-kept records
concerning the identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of a patient may
not be disclosed.78 The attorney general noted that the legislature had not
repealed article 4495b, section 5.08(b), despite a notation to that effect in the
Texas Civil Statutes pocket part for 1987. 79 The attorney general held that
68. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-481 (1987).
69. Id. at 2.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 4.
72. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29cc), § 19a (Vernon Supp. 1989) (sets
out conditions under which results of polygraph examination may be released).
73. ORD-481 at 10. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp.
1989) specifies that all information compiled by governmental bodies "pursuant to law or ordi-
nance or in connection with the transaction of official business is public information and avail-
able to the public ... with the following exceptions only: ... (11) inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than one in
litigation with the agency . ... "




77. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-482 (1987).
78. ORD-482 at 4-5; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(11) (Vernon
Supp. 1989).
79. ORD-482 at 4-5.
1989]
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the section is valid with respect to records maintained by physicians that
reflect the identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of the patient. 80
The attorney general also discussed the scope of the Open Records exemp-
tion in section 3(a)(6). 81 The requesting party in this decision had asked for
all information concerning the drafting of a city ordinance, including the
names of the drafters. The attorney general held that the names of the draft-
ers were not excluded by section 3(a)(6). 82 In addition, the attorney general
held that if the governmental body incorporates information in a final docu-
ment that it disclosed to the public or in materials that explain to the public
the basis for a decision, then section 3(a)(6) provides no protection. 83
ORD-483. This decision dealt with whether certain information held by
the Texas Savings and Loan Department was excepted from public disclo-
sure. The requesting party sought detailed information regarding an over-
view of a Texas savings and loan that included its lending practice and
financial situation.8 4 Another party requested any information concerning
the entire Texas savings and loan industry during 1986 and 1987. The sec-
ond request also wanted the identification of the savings and loan institutions
that had experienced financial trouble during the same period. The attorney
general held that the first two categories of information, namely the report
and order from the investigation and the monthly monitoring reports, are
protected under sections 11.18 and 8.05(d) of the Savings and Loan Act.85
The attorney general stated, however, that general information about the
condition of the savings and loan industry may not be withheld. 86 For ex-
ample, a report that provided a brief historical overview of the savings and
loan industry in Texas or a document that described the current status of the
savings and loan department must be disclosed.8 7 In addition, exhibits that
have been incorporated into these documents and contain statistical data on
the general condition of the industry may not be withheld.88
ORD-484. The city attorney of El Paso, Texas asked the attorney general
to rule on a request for information regarding complaints about sixty-eight
El Paso Police Department officers. The requesting party sought documents
relating to complaints that had been directed toward the officers, identifica-
tion of complaints, and the status of the complaints. The El Paso city attor-
ney sought to keep this information confidential by maintaining "history
cards" for each police officer.89 These cards included information regarding
complaints and their disposition. The city sought to protect the records of
80. Id. at 6.
81. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1989) exempts
"drafts and working papers involved in the preparation of proposed legislation .
82. ORD-482 at 9.
83. Id. at 10.
84. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-483 (1987).
85. Id. at 7; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, §§ 8.05(d) 11.18 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
86. ORD-483 at 8.
87. Id. at 7-8.
88. Id. at 9.
89. The cards included hearings indicating the disposition of each case. For example,
among the various categories were "unfunded, not sustained, sustain, [and] information only."
Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-484 at 1 (1987).
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those officers whose cards had the notation "unfounded" or "not sustained,"
arguing that releasing the records would be a false-light invasion of privacy
since the governmental body had serious doubt about the truth of the allega-
tions. The attorney general held, however, that even if the documents might
be construed as a false-light invasion of privacy, 90 the public interest in
knowing how the El Paso Police Department had resolved these complaints
against its officers outweighed the officers' interests in keeping the informa-
tion confidential. 91 The attorney general did, however allow the city attor-
ney to withhold from disclosure certain details about officers' off-duty life.92
ORD-485. This decision dealt with whether oral or written information
that was presented to a governmental body during an executive session, pur-
suant to the Open Meetings Act, was confidential under the Open Records
Act. The attorney general held that if the document submitted to the gov-
ernmental body in executive session was otherwise excepted from disclosure
under the Open Records Act, then the governmental body could withhold
that document.93 If a party submitted an otherwise disclosable document
under the Open Records Act to a governmental body in executive session,
however, the document was not exempt from public disclosure. 94
ORD-486. This open records decision dealt with a recent amendment to
section 3(a)(15) of the Act dealing with the availability of birth and death
records. The Seventieth Legislature amended section 3(a)(15) to include
birth and death records maintained not only by the Bureau of Vital Statistics
of the Texas Department of Health but also by a local registration official. 95
The attorney general, in reviewing legislative history, found that the legisla-
ture, through this amendment, wanted to prevent incidents of fraud.96 The
legislature was concerned about people who created false identities for them-
selves by obtaining information and copies of birth and death records. 97 The
legislature was also attempting to safeguard against the potential abuse of
information that is included in birth and death records.98 The attorney gen-
eral held that section 3(a)( 15) does, in fact, restrict access to birth and death
certificates. 99 This protection, however, did not extend to summary lists of
births and deaths and, accordingly, these lists were disclosable.1°° In addi-
tion, under section 3(a)(15) governmental bodies have the discretion to dis-
close the information protected by that section because this exception is a
90. Id. at 5. The false light privacy doctrine permits the police department to withhold
unfounded charges against the police.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id. at 6.
93. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-485 (1987).
94. Id. at 10.
95. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(15) (Vernon Supp. 1989) exempts
"birth and death records maintained by the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the Texas Department
of Health or by a local registration official ... 
96. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-4862 (1987).
97. Id.
98. Id.





ORD-487. This open records request dealt with the transfer of patients
from one hospital to another. This practice is often referred to as "patient
dumping," and is carried out when patients cannot guarantee payment for
medical care. The requesting party sought information regarding the Texas
Department of Health's investigation of patient transfer complaints. The
requesting party wanted the governmental body to release hospital patient
transfer information. The attorney general held that there were certain doc-
uments that were protected from disclosure.' 0 2 For example, the attorney
general authorized the withholding of documents entitled "memorandum of
transfer," when the particular form identified a patient and was prepared by
a physician acting as a physician or by a person acting under a physician's
direction.'0 3 The form could not be withheld, however, if the physician
signed the form as a part of a purely administrative duty.1°4 The attorney
general found, however, that certain of the other information was exempt
under section 5.08 of the Texas Medical Practices Act.105
ORD-488. The Sixty-Ninth Texas Legislature amended the Open Records
Act to protect public employees from the disclosure of their home addresses
and telephone numbers.10 6 In addition, officials who choose to withhold the
disclosure of such information may do so under section 3(a)(17) and section
4 of the Act. 107 The city attorney of Dallas received a request for the ad-
dresses of retired city of Dallas employees. The attorney general held that
the information concerning those retirees, who were not peace officers and
who retired prior to the effective date of the amendment, must be dis-
closed.' 0 8 The attorney general also dealt with the cost of reproducing
records, which is governed by section 9(a) of the Act. 109 The attorney gen-
eral held that under section 9(a) the party requesting such information must
carry the cost, which included the labor and materials needed to access and
copy the information, unless the request was for fewer than fifty pages of
material that was readily available. 110 If the party does request fewer than
fifty pages, the materials and labor required to delete the information that is
not available under the Open Records Act may be calculated into the deter-
mination of whether such information is actually readily available. 1 '
ORD-489. This request dealt with whether the mailing addresses of sub-
101. Id.
102. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-487 at 3-6 (1988).
103. Id. at 3-4.
104. Id. at 4.
105. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b (Vernon Supp. 1989).
106. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(17) (Vernon Supp. 1989) allows
agencies to withhold "the home addresses and home telephone numbers of each official and
employee of a governmental body except as otherwise provided by section 3A of this Act, and
of peace officers as defined by article 2.12, Code of Criminal Procedure 1964, as amended, or
by section 51.212, Texas Education Code; .... "
107. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, §§ 3(a)(17), 3A, 4 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
108. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-488 at 3 (1988).
109. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 9(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
110. ORD-488 at 7.
111. Id. at 9.
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scribers to the Texas Highways Magazine was subject to public disclosure
under the Act. The State Highway Department claimed that releasing the
list would invade the privacy interest of the subscribers, but the attorney
general rejected this allegation.' " 2 The Highway Department then sought to
obtain the "market price" for the subscriber list, but the attorney general
rejected this argument as well, stating that the department could charge no
more than its actual costs for production of the subscriber list.'1 3
ORD-490. The Board of Vocational Nurse Examiners asked the attorney
general whether it must disclose certain information to the Texas Peer
Assistance Program for Impaired Nurses (TPAPIN)." 4 The TPAPIN
sought information dealing with a complaint against a particular licensed
vocational nurse. The attorney general held that the information requested
could be disseminated to health care personnel to whom the impaired nurse
had been referred.' ' The attorney general also held that since the transfer
was authorized by statute, it would not violate section 10(a) of the Texas
Open Records Act, 116 which prohibits the release of information deemed
confidential by law. The attorney general went on to hold that the informa-
tion, although disclosable in this instance, could not be disclosed to the gen-
eral public." 17
ORD-491. The city attorney of Texarkana asked whether the meeting min-
utes of the Law Enforcement Advisory Committee (LEAC) are subject to
disclosure under the Open Records Act. Included in this committee were
the chief of police of Texarkana, Texas, the chief of police of Texarkana,
Arkansas, the sheriff of Bowie County, Texas, and the sheriff of Miller
County, Arkansas. The agencies were located in a building that sat on the
border between Texas and Arkansas. Because of the location of the building
and the representatives involved, special legislation was needed to set up this
law enforcement committee. LEAC was designed to oversee the operation
and maintenance of the building and the joint records. The attorney general
skirted the question of whether LEAC was a governmental body itself under
section 2(l)(f) of the Open Records Act' 8 and instead relied upon other
grounds. Since it was the city of Texarkana that was requested to disclose
the information and was subject to the Act, then any LEAC minutes held by
112. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-489 at 4 (1988).
113. Id. at 6.
114. The Texas Peer Assistance Program for Impaired Nurses provides help for nurses
dealing with drug related problems or mental illness. Such help is provided pursuant to a
contract between TPAPIN and the Board of Vocational Nurse Examiners. See TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5561C-3 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
115. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-490 at 4 (1988).
116. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 10(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) ("informa-
tion deemed confidential under the terms of this Act shall not be distributed").
117. ORD-490 at 4-5.
118. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-491 at 2 (1988). TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a,
§ 2(lf) (Vernon Supp. 1989) defines "Governmental body" as "the part, section, or portion of
every organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution or agency which is sup-
ported in whole or in part by public funds, or which expends public funds. Public funds as
used herein shall mean funds of the State of Texas or any governmental subdivision thereof
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the chief of police were also subject to the Act.' 19 In deciding the case, the
attorney general called into question, if not outright overruled, prior Open
Records Decision No. 461.120 The attorney general held that a majority of
the documents should be disclosed. 12 1
ORD-492. Bob Bullock, the comptroller of public accounts, asked the at-
torney general to consider whether information to which the government has
access but that has been stored in a private business computer was subject to
disclosure under the Texas Open Records Act. The comptroller also in-
quired as to whether economic forecasts are protected by subsections
3(a)(10) or 3(a)(1 1) of the Act.' 22 The attorney general held that if the in-
formation was in the form of raw data and economic projections and had not
been attained through the authority of a governmental body, then the state
comptroller or some other governmental entity can, on an as-needed basis,
access such information from the private consultant, and the information
that remains with that consultant is not subject to the Act. 123 The attorney
general did hold, however, that if the raw data and projections were accessed
and stored by the governmental body or if the information appeared in the
comptroller's revenue estimates, then such information must be disclosed. 124
The specific economic forecast that the comptroller submitted for review
consisted of advice and recommendations and were protected from required
disclosure under section 3(a)( 11).125
ORD-493. The information sought was the negotiations of the Texas State
Board of Pharmacy concerning disciplinary action against a licensee. The
Texas Board of Pharmacy asked the attorney general to reconsider prior
Open Records Decision No. 474, but the attorney general declined to reverse
his position. The attorney general held that certain items of information
were subject to disclosure under the Act including, for example, correspon-
dence between the Texas Board of Pharmacy and a licensee dealing with
informal conferences, proposed notice of hearings, and charges or agreed
Board orders.126 Although the Board argued that this information could be
withheld under the exception of section 3(a)(3),127 the attorney general held
that this information could only be withheld if the Board thought such non-
119. ORD-491 at 3.
120. Id. at 4.
121. Id. at 7-8.
122. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, §§ 3(a)(10), (11) (Vernon Supp. 1989)
exempt "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential by statute or judicial decision... [, and] inter-agency memorandums
or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than one in litigation with the
agency ....,
123. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-492 at 6 (1988).
124. Id. at 3.
125. Id. at 6.
126. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-493 (1988).
127. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989). This sec-
tion exempts information pertaining to civil or criminal litigation or settlement negotiations,
"to which the state or political subdivision is, or may be, a party, or to which an officer or
employee of the state or political subdivision, as a consequence of his office or employment, is
or may be a party, that the attorney general or the respective attorneys of the various political
subdivisions has determined should be withheld from public inspection ...."
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disclosure was necessary to maintain its strategy when dealing with licensees
who have not seen the information.1 28 The attorney general held that the
information could also be withheld if the disclosure of the information
would unduly hamper law enforcement in a criminal investigation.1 29 The
attorney general also held that information concerning the Board's investiga-
tive reports about chemically, mentally, or physically impaired pharmacists
could be withheld. 130
ORD-494. The executive director of the Texas Water Commission asked
the attorney general whether certain information reported to the Texas
Water Commission in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) is subject to the
Open Records Act. The information dealt with hazardous substances and
the reports in question were required by the federal government. Union Car-
bide wrote one of these mandatory reports and asked if the information deal-
ing with the chemical releases of hazardous substances could be kept
confidential. Union Carbide wanted to withhold this information since the
public dissemination of the locations would reveal its customers' identities,
and such disclosure would be tantamount to releasing a customer list. The
water commission sought to protect the information pursuant to section
3(a)(10), 13 1 which covers trade secrets and commercial or financial informa-
tion. The attorney general held, however that this information could not be
withheld under the Act and reasoned that neither the Texas Water Commis-
sion nor the company in question had met the trade secret criteria that
would have allowed an exception. 132 Furthermore, there was no showing
how the customer information would have caused substantial competitive
harm. 133 Absent this type of showing, the attorney general held that the
information was not entitled to the exception. 134
ORD-495. The request for information was directed toward the Capital
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, pursuant to the Open Records Act.
The information sought was for a copy of the minutes or a tape recording of
an executive session held by the Board in 1987. The Amalgamated Transit
Union argued that the executive session itself was in violation of the Open
Meetings Act and that this violation should render the information dis-
closable. The attorney general held that he not only lacked the authority to
make the determination whether the Open Meetings Act had been violated,
but also that he lacked the authority to enforce the Open Meetings Act. 135
The attorney general held that the Open Meetings Act applied, but the re-
questing parting could obtain the material only through an Open Meetings
128. ORD-493 at 2.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(10) (Vernon Supp. 1989) (exempts
trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained under specific circumstances).
132. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-494 at 5 (1988).
133. Id. at 7.
134. Id.




ORD-496. This request dealt with whether "waybill samples" 137 provided
to the Texas Railroad Commission by the Interstate Commerce Commission
were subject to the Open Records Act. Although much of this waybill infor-
mation is available for the public by way of federal law, some of the informa-
tion may remain confidential. 138 For example, highly sensitive commercial
and financial data is not subject to disclosure under federal law. 139 The ICC
created the disclosure rules concerning waybill information. 14° The Rail-
road Commission asked whether these ICC rules preempted the Texas Open
Records Act. Although the federal regulations did not preempt the Act, the
information at issue, if released, clearly would have impaired the Railroad
Commission's ability to obtain the information in the future. 14 1 Due to this
result, the information was not subject to disclosure under section 3(a)(10) of
the Act. 142
ORD-497. The chairman of the Board of Regents of the University of
Houston system was asked for documents that related to patent applications
on the super-conductivity research at the University of Houston. The Uni-
versity counsel asked whether it was proper for the chairman of the Board of
Regents to receive the request for information instead of the custodian of the
information, pursuant to section 5(a) of the Act.143 The university con-
tended that the chancellor rather than the chairman is the custodian of the
information. The attorney general rejected the university's contention that
the Act requires members of the public to request information specifically
from the chief administrative officer of a governmental body and that a fail-
ure do so would render a request invalid.144 The attorney general held that
the thrust behind sections 4 and 5 of the Act 14 5 was simply to produce infor-
mation for the public and not impose a requirement on the requestor to use
special language. 146 Furthermore, according to the attorney general, chief
136. Id. at 4.
137. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-496 (1988). "A 'waybill' is a document prepared from the bill
of lading contract or shipper's instructions about the disposition of freight. It forms the basis
for determining freight charges and interline settlements." Id.
138. Id. at 1.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 4.
142. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(10) (Vernon Supp. 1989); see supra
note 131.
143. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 5(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) provides:
The chief administrative officer of the governmental body shall be the custodian
of public records of the governmental body. It shall be the duty of the custodian
of public records, subject to penalties provided in this Act, to see that the public
records are made available for public inspection and copying; that the records
are carefully protected and preserved from deterioration, alteration, mutilation,
loss, removal, or destruction; and that public records are repaired, renovated, or
rebound when necessary to preserve them properly. When records are no longer
currently in use, it shall be within the discretion of the agency to determine a
period of time of which said records will be preserved.
144. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-497 (1988).
145. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, §§ 4, 5 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
146. ORD-497 at 2.
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administrative officers have a duty to comply with the Act and make known
to the public the identity of persons to whom an open records request should
be directed. 147 The attorney general held that section 51.911 of the Texas
Education Code protects from disclosure information related to the com-
mercial application or use of super-conductivity research at the University of
Houston. 14 8
ORD-498. The Texas Department of Public Safety asked whether informa-
tion obtained from drivers' license records and in the form of a class type
listing was protected from disclosure. The attorney general noted that the
legislature added subsection (j) to section 21 of article 6687b 149 and conse-
quently overruled the holding of prior Open Records Decision No. 465.150
The attorney general found that the lists at issue in this request were covered
by article 6687b and therefore, the documents should not be released to the
public. 151
ORD-499. In this decision, the attorney general addressed the issue of
whether information created and maintained by a private attorney working
for the city was subject to disclosure under the Texas Open Records Act.
This particular decision dealt with two similar situations. In one, a request
was made for information that related to official city business. This informa-
tion was compiled and maintained by a local private attorney. The other
situation dealt with information on the rate of compensation paid to a city-
hired private attorney acting as an independent investigator for the city. In
both situations, the private attorneys had their own practices, offices, and
files, and worked for the cities on an at-will basis. Both attorneys had agree-
ments with their cities indicating that it was only when the work was com-
pleted that the information became a government record.
The attorney general applied a three-part test for determining when infor-
mation collected by outside consultants was subject to the Open Records
Act.1 52 The attorney general concluded that records relating to legal serv-
ices performed by the private attorney are subject to the Act if the attorney
performed such services at the request of the municipality. 153 The attorney
general did recognize, however, that some information sought may fall
within an exception under the Act, but absent a showing that it does, such
information must be disclosed.' 54
147. Id.
148. Id. at 7.
149. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687(21)6) (Vernon Supp. 1989) states, "[t]he de-
partment is not authorized to provide class-type listings from the basic drivers license record
file to any person or business; provided, however, such information may be made available to
an official of the federal government, the state, a city, town, county, special district, or other
political subdivision for official governmental purposes only."
150. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-498 at 7 (1988).
151. Id.
152. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-499 at 2 (1988). The three-part test inquired whether "(1) the
information relates to the governmental body's official duties or business; (2) the consultant
acts as agent of the governmental body in collecting the information; and (3) the governmental
body has or is entitled to access to the information." Id.
153. Id. at 5.
154. Id. at 7.
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ORD-500. The chief appraiser of the Harris County Appraisal District
asked the attorney general to rule on whether information submitted in ac-
cordance with section 22.27 of the Texas Tax Code, which attempted to keep
such information confidential, was exempted from public disclosure under
the Open Records Act. Ordinarily, agreements made to preserve the confi-
dentiality of certain information cannot circumvent the purpose of the Open
Records Act. The attorney general held, however, that section 22.27 of the
Tax Code did permit the appraisal district to enter into the confidentiality
agreement that categorized the sought after information as not subject to
disclosure. 155
ORD-501. The Stewart Title Company sought the annual escrow audit
maintained by the State Board of Insurance and filed for the Atascosa
County Abstract & Title Company. The State Board of Insurance con-
tended that the information was confidential, by law, pursuant to article 9.39
of the Texas Insurance Code. The attorney general found that the Insurance
Code provision was controlling and, consequently, the documents must be
withheld from the general public.156 The attorney general went on to hold,
however, that according to the same Insurance Code provision, while the
public was not entitled to the information, Stewart Title was entitled to re-
ceive the report. 157
ORD-502. In this decision, the attorney general addressed the issue of
whether photographs of police officers are excepted from public disclosure
under section 3(a)(19) of the Open Records Act. 158 The photographs sought
were of officers that had been injured in a shooting incident and photographs
of off-duty officers who were injured in an automobile accident.
After an exhaustive legislative history of the amendment, the attorney
general noted a potential conflict between sections 3(a)(19) and 3(c) of the
Act. 159 The attorney general recognized that one application of 3(a)(19)
could be that photographs of peace officers would be protected from disclo-
sure only if the release of the photographs would place a police officer's life
or physical safety in danger.'6° Under this interpretation, however, the at-
torney general noted that not all photographs of peace officers would be pro-
155. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-500 at 9-10 (1988).
156. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-501 at 3 (1988).
157. Id.
158. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(19) (Vernon Supp. 1989) exempts:
photographs that depict a peace officer as defined by Article 2.12, Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, or a security officer commissioned under Section 51.212, Educa-
tion Code, the release of which would endanger the life or physical safety of the
officer unless: (A) the officer is under indictment or charged with an offense by
information; or (B) the officer is a party in a fire or police civil service hearing or
a case in arbitration; or (C) the photograph is introduced as evidence in a judi-
cial proceeding.
159. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(c) (Vernon Supp. 1989) allows the
custodian of records to exercise discretion to "make public any information contained within
Section 3, Subsection (a)6, 9, 11, and 15. The custodian of a photograph exempt from disclo-
sure under Section 3(a)(19) may make the photograph public, but only if the officer gives
written consent to the disclosure."
160. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-502 at 4 (1988).
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tected by section 3(a)(19).161 Under another interpretation of section
3(a)(19) the attorney general stated that such photographs would not be sub-
ject to disclosure because the release of the pictures would endanger the of-
ficers. 162 The first interpretation is based on an "only if" standard, while the
second interpretation does not require such a finding. 163 The attorney gen-
eral chose this second interpretation as reflecting legislative intent. 164
ORD-503. The requestor wanted information regarding the conservator-
ship and receivership of a company investigated by the State Board of Insur-
ance. The State Board of Insurance had investigated First Title of Houston
and initiated a judicial proceeding that allowed for the appointment of a
conservator. The judicial proceeding was subsequently nonsuited. A mem-
ber of the public sought information regarding the Board's investigation and
actions in respect to First Title of Houston's receivership and conservator-
ship. The attorney general held, however that the material requested was
not available for disclosure because of section 3A of article 21.28-A of the
Texas Insurance Code. 16 5 This provision shields from disclosure informa-
tion and material maintained by the State Board of Insurance concerning the
supervision or conservatorship of any insurance company. The attorney
general held that the protection of the insurance code provision does not
extend to material dealing with the appointment of a receiver for the insur-
ance company.' 6 6
ORD-504. The Texas Railroad Commission received a request for informa-
tion that concerned hydrological work carried out by Texaco at a gas
processing plant. The information requested consisted of ground water qual-
ity assessment reports, hydrological work summaries, and many maps,
graphs, and charts. Texaco prepared this information pursuant to its pollu-
tion abatement activities. The attorney general held that the Act did not
protect this information from disclosure because the Railroad Commission
failed to establish how the disclosure of such information would create diffi-
culties in obtaining information in the future. 167 Furthermore, the attorney
general held that there was no indication that trade secrets would be re-
vealed or that such disclosure would result in substantial competitive injury
to Texaco. 168 This decision also overruled ORD-479.169
ORD-505. The El Paso county attorney asked the attorney general to rule
on a request that sought voter ballots from the March 1988 primary elec-
tions in El Paso County and the accompanying computer software that was
utilized in vote tabulation. The attorney general ruled that voter ballots that
are kept by the election record custodian after a twenty-two-month retention
161. Id.
162. Id. at 5.
163. Id. at 6.
164. Id.
165. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-503 at 3 (1988).
166. Id.
167. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-504 at 7 (1988).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 5.
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period are subject to the Open Records Act.1 70 Accordingly, these records
are exempt from public disclosure prior to the duration of this retention
period. 171 The attorney general held that the computer software programs
used to tabulate the votes that had been copyrighted pursuant to the Copy-
right Act were not disclosable to the requestor. 172
ORD-506. The requesting party in this decision asked for disclosure of cel-
lular mobile telephone numbers of county officials and employees. The at-
torney general held that the cellular mobile telephone numbers given to
vehicles, both public and private, used by county officials and employees
with specific law enforcement responsibilities are not subject to disclosure
pursuant to section 3(a)(8) of the Act.' 73 The attorney general held that no
other provision of the Open Records Act protected the information from
disclosure unless the county official or employee had fulfilled certain require-
ments.174 The officials or employees must pay directly for the purchase, in-
stallation, and billing of the phones installed in their private vehicles and
request that the numbers be maintained as confidential. 175
II. ELECTIONS
The most celebrated election law case during the Survey period was Texas
Democratic Executive Committee v. Rains.'76 After the resignation of Jus-
tice Rudolph Esquivel, effective January 1, 1989, the chairman of the Texas
Democratic Executive Committee sought to get acceptance of the certifica-
tion enabling Ron Carr to assume the Democratic candidate position for the
unexpired term of Justice Esquivel.
Though the resignation was received in June 1988, Justice Esquivel was
informed that it would not be accepted until November of that same year.
Because the governor's office had not accepted the resignation, there was no
vacancy on the San Antonio court of appeals. Absent a vacancy on the
court, the secretary of state claimed that there was neither a duly nor the
authority to accept the certification of Ron Carr. A mandamus proceeding
under Texas Government Code section 22.002(c) and Texas Election Code
section 273.061 followed.
The court held that the governor was obligated to accept the resignation
given by Justice Esquivel.177 Once accepted, the court recognized that a
vacancy had been created on the court of appeals that, in turn, required the
170. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-505 at 3 (1988).
171. Id. at 4.
172. Id. at 5.
173. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1989) exempts
disclosure of "records of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors that deal with the detec-
tion, investigation, and prosecution of crime and the internal records and notations of such law
enforcement agencies and prosecutors which are maintained for internal use in matters relating
to law enforcement and prosecution .... "
174. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-505 at 4.
175. Id. at 6.
176. 756 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1988).
177. Id. at 307.
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secretary of state to act.' 78 According to the Supreme Court of Texas, an
effective resignation must include only written, signed, and delivered docu-
ments.' 79 Here, since all requirements had been met, the resignation was
valid.1 8 0 The court rejected the secretary of state's assertion that a resigna-
tion, to be effective, must include an acceptance.18 ' Accordingly, the court
ordered the secretary of state to certify Mr. Carr as a candidate for the
unexpired term of the justice.18 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided two
cases during the Survey period that dealt with important rights under the
Election Code and the Federal Voting Rights Act. The first was League of
United Latin American Citizens Counsel No. 4386 v. Midland Independent
School District.'8 3 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court, which or-
dered that the Midland Independent School District be divided into seven
single member districts for voting purposes.' 8 4 The case was originally de-
cided by a panel of the Fifth Circuit 85 but was vacated when the court
decided to consider the case en banc. The per curiam en banc decision con-
sidered the Midland Independent School Board's argument that legislative
deference, owed by the federal courts, required that one of the school
board's, and not the district court's, redistricting proposals be put into effect.
The court found, however, that the school board's plans violated Texas Edu-
cation Code section 23.204(b) because its proposals allowed fewer than sev-
enty percent of the board members to be elected from single member
districts.' 86 Accordingly, the court found that the proposals of the school
board were not subject to any deference on the part of the federal court.18 7
The second case decided by the Fifth Circuit that dealt with important
rights under the Election Code and the Federal Voting Rights Act was Leroy
v. City of Houston.' 88 The case set out the appropriate procedures for ob-
taining an award of attorneys' fees in cases brought under the Voting Rights






183. 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam).
184. Id. at 548.
185. 812 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1986).
186. 829 F.2d at 547. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 23.024(b) (1987) states:
The board of trustees of a school district, on its own motion, may order that
trustees of the district are to be elected from single-member trustee districts or
that not fewer than 70 percent of the members of the board of trustees are to be
elected from single-member trustee districts with remaining trustees to be
elected from the district at large. Before entering the order, the board must:
(1) hold a public hearing at which registered voters of the district are given an
opportunity to comment on whether or not they favor the election of trustees in
the manner proposed by the board; and (2) publish notice of the hearing in a
newspaper that has general circulation in the district, not later than the seventh
day before the day of the hearing.
187. 829 F.2d at 548.
188. 831 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1987).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982).
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million for attorneys' fees and costs. With only two judges sitting on the
court of appeals panel, the Fifth Circuit reversed. 190
Under the Voting Rights Act,191 one must be a "prevailing party" to trig-
ger an award of attorney's fees. If a plaintiff becomes a "prevailing party" as
the result of a judgment, then he is undoubtedly entitled to recover the ex-
pense of attorney's fees.192 If the plaintiff becomes a "prevailing party" as
the result of other means, such as settlement or other action taken by the
defendant, then it is less clear whether attorney's fees will be awarded.19 3
The Fifth Circuit held that there were two questions that must be asked to
determine who is a "prevailing party."' 94 The first question asked must be
one that determines whether the plaintiff's case brought forth the defend-
ant's action. If so, the next question must determine the scope of compensa-
ble action. In this case, the Fifth Circuit declined to disturb the fact finding
of the district court that the plaintiffs' litigation was a significant catalyst to
the city's adoption of single member districts.195 The Fifth Circuit did not
agree, however, to the finding that the litigants had a substantial effect on the
Justice Department's treatment of the voting rights dispute.' 96 This error by
the trial court, however, was not sufficient to overturn the finding that the
plaintiffs were entitled to some fees. 197 The Fifth Circuit found that not all
of the fees awarded were legally compensable. 198 For example, one of the
fees awarded by the district court, for the lobbying activity of the plaintiffs'
attorney, was, according to the Fifth Circuit, not compensable. 199
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the case was the Fifth Circuit's re-
jection of the trial court's contingency multiplier. The Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion followed the Supreme Court's plurality decision in Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air.2°° In order to qualify for a
contingency multiplier, the Fifth Circuit held that both the need and justifi-
cation for such an award must be in the record with supporting evidence. 20'
In addition, the district court must make a specific finding of fact in order
for the court of appeals to affirm such a finding. 20 2 The Fifth Circuit also
found that expert witness fees, beyond the stated expenses, may not be
awarded to a prevailing party under a fee-shifting statute unless the applica-
ble statute explicitly awards such costs. 20 3 The Fifth Circuit modified the
award to $693,805.00 and remanded for an entry of judgment in that
190. 831 F.2d at 586.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1982).
192. 831 F.2d at 579.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 580.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 581.
198. Id. at 581-83.
199. Id. at 582.
200. 483 U.S. 711 (1987).






The Texas secretary of state, Jack Rains, was kept busy during the Survey
period, which corresponded with a general election. In Cohen v. Rains20 5 an
incumbent justice of the Houston court of appeals (First District) brought a
mandamus action against the secretary of state, the Texas Republican Exec-
utive Committee, and a number of Republican Party officials. The manda-
mus sough to exclude the name of Jim Scott from the 1988 Republican
general primary election ballot. Jim Scott was running for the position of
justice of the First Court of Appeals District Place 4. Justice Cohen was the
('incumbent and the only candidate for the office on the Democratic ticket.
Cohen alleged that Scott's application did not pass the Texas Election Code
muster because it lacked the needed 750 signatures. 20 6
On the merits, the court found that of the 1,071 signatures presented, 421
were duplicate signatures. When the duplicates were subtracted, the net to-
tal of valid signatures equaled 650. Justice Cohen contended that this was
less than the 750 required by law. Mr. Scott, on the other hand, argued that
duplicative signatures were permissible because of the two different petition
forms furnished by the secretary of state's office. The court of appeals re-
jected these arguments and held that Jim Scott was not entitled to have his
name placed on the ballot. 20 7 The court issued a writ of mandamus to
George Strake as chairman of the Republican Executive Committee.
208
Secretary of state Rains was in court again in a case brought by three
individuals and the Libertarian Party of Texas in Pilcher v. Rains.20 9 The
plaintiffs alleged that sections 141.062(a)(3), 141.063(2)(B), and
181.006(b)(1) of the Texas Election Code were unconstitutional. The court
found that the secretary of state failed to show a need for the voter registra-
tion numbers on petitions seeking new party ballot recognition. 210
The court held that the integrity of the election process may be adequately
maintained without the use of the voter registration numbers. 211 For exam-
ple, the state would have been able to verify signatures by using the signer's
name and, if needed, address. In light of this, the court found that voter
registration numbers were unnecessary, and the named provisions of the
Texas Election Code were in violation of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments of the Constitution. 21 2
In Bacon v. Harris County Republican Executive Committee 213 the judge
of the 338th Judicial District Court of Harris County asked the court to
204. Id.
205. 745 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); see also Plummer v.
Veselka, 744 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
206. 745 S.W.2d at 950; see also Cohen v. Strake, 743 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. App.-Houston
[Ist Dist.] 1988, no writ).
207. 745 S.W.2d at 954.
208. Id. at 955.
209. 683 F. Supp. 1130 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
210. Id. at 1134.
211. Id. at 1135.
212. Id.
213. 743 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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order the secretary of the Harris County Republican Party to omit the name
of Mark Sokolow from the Republican party primary election. The judge
contended that Sokolow did not state on the petition exactly what office was
sought, namely, "Judge," but instead only listed the office sought as that of
"338th District Court." The court noted, however, that each of the seventy-
five pages of signatures included the office sought as "Judge, 338th Dist. Ct."
and that this was sufficient. 2 14 Furthermore, it was asserted that the applica-
tion was defective because the signature on the petition accompanying Soko-
low's application for a place on the ballot did not contain the word "Texas"
as part of the resident's address. The court also rejected this argument. 2 15 .1
III. ANNEXATION AND INCORPORATION
In Mahone v. Addicks Utility District21 6 a land owner brought an action
under the federal civil rights and antitrust laws against other land owners
and a utility district claiming that his rights were violated when the district
refused to annex his land. The district court dismissed the case. The Ad-
dicks Utility District of Harris County is organized under Texas law and has
been given certain powers. Among these powers are the Addicks Utility
District's ability to review property owners' petitions for annexation into the
utility district and to make the determination as to which properties are an-
nexed. Within the district, and roughly at its center, was a twenty-acre tract
of unannexed property completely surrounded by annexed land. Mahone,
the plaintiff and owner of this twenty acres of unannexed land sought to
increase its development value by annexing the land into the district. The
court denied Mahone's annexation petition, however, because he failed to
attach development plans and pay money to certain developers.
Mahone believed, however, that this refusal to annex his property
amounted to an illegal conspiracy between the district and developers whose
property had already been annexed. Mahone filed a suit in federal court
against a number of defendants, claiming civil rights violations. Mahone
also filed a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tion's statute. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim, which the district court granted. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed with respect to the dismissal of Mahone's voting rights claim.2 17
The court held that the power to annex land is a decision that is afforded
almost no discretion in the court system and is a decision that should be left
entirely to the legislative system, as long as the equal protection clause is not
violated.2 18 The court also rejected Mahone's allegation that he had been
denied due process because there was a failure to show a deprivation of a
property interest. 219 The court held that the expectation of annexation was
214. Id. at 370.
215. Id.
216. 836 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1988).
217. Id. at 928-29.
218. Id. at 928.
219. Id. at 931.
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not a property interest under the due process clause and therefore not enti-
tled to protection under the Constitution.220 In addition, the court held that
the Texas Water Code, upon which Mahone relied, did not even give him the
right to have his tract of land annexed to the district.2 2 The court, however,
reversed the district court's dismissal of Mahone's equal protection claim. 222
The fundamental purpose of the equal protection clause, the court noted, is
that all persons similarly situated are to be treated alike. 223 The court found
that Mahone had stated a claim when he alleged that the district had devel-
oped two classifications. One group, like Mahone, was required to file devel-
opment plans before annexation proceedings could begin and a second
group, which consisted of persons similarly situated, were given until later in
the annexation process to file their plans. The court remanded the equal
protection claim to the district court for further consideration. 224 Finally,
the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's antitrust claims. 225
IV. CONDEMNATION AND DEDICATION
The Texas Supreme Court decided one case in the condemnation area dur-
ing the Survey period. In Callejo v. Brazos Electric Power Co-operative,
Inc. 226 the land owner, Callejo, owned a 130.71-acre tract of land. The de-
fendant, Brazos Electric, had an easement across the land to construct, oper-
ate, and maintain an electric transmission line. In 1948 Brazos constructed
a 69,000-volt transmission line on the tract, which it operated until 1985
when a new line was constructed with a 138,000-volt capacity. After Brazos
filed the petition in condemnation the court appointed a special commis-
sioner to assess damages. The land owner, Callejo, disagreed with the
amount awarded by the special commissioner and the issue of damages went
to the jury.
The jury found that Callejo was entitled to $91,232.00, which was the
difference between the value of the easement before condemnation and the
value after condemnation. The trial court, however, granted a motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and rendered judgment for Callejo in
the amount of $422,620.00. The court of appeals reversed, however, and
found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of post-
taking value.
Callejo then applied for a writ of error in the Texas Supreme Court, con-
tending that there was no evidence to support the jury's finding. The
supreme court agreed with Callejo and noted that no witness testified to a
value higher than $33,541.00 yet the jury found $364,928.80.227 The
supreme court rejected the argument made by Brazos and held that the jury
220. Id.
221. Id. at 930.
222. Id. at 938.
223. Id. at 932.
224. Id. at 938.
225. Id.
226. 755 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. 1988).
227. Id. at 75.
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could not take all testimony as to both pre- and post-taking values and blend
it together to come up with its own finding on post-taking value. 22 8
The opinion by Justice Kilgarlan then identified some thirteen opinions
that "may" conflict with the Callejo ruling.229 Justice Spears, in a dissent
joined by Justices Ray and Culver, noted that in light of all the conflicting
opinions that the majority disagreed with, it seemed clear that juries in con-
demnation cases were free to select any award amount that was in the gen-
eral range of the testimony presented. 230 The dissent went on to say that if
juries were not given this flexibility, then witnesses would no longer help the
jury, but instead, control them.23'
In Mercer v. Phillips Natural Gas Co. 232 the gas company instituted a con-
demnation proceeding in the county court of Fayetteville County, which has
no county court at law. The court condemned certain property and awarded
the land owners compensation. The land owners did not appeal, but subse-
quently filed a case in the district court and asserted that the county court's
judgment was invalid because of a lack of jurisdiction. The district court
found, and this court affirmed, that the trial court did, in fact, have jurisdic-
tion.233 The court based its decision on a reading of a 1985 law that granted
the Fayetteville county court jurisdiction to hear and decide eminent domain
proceedings. 234 The court also recognized that the Texas Constitution
granted the legislature the authority to vary the jurisdiction of county
courts. 235 Although now repealed, the provision provided the legislature
with the power to alter, in any way, both the civil and criminal jurisdictions
of the county courts. 236
In Schneider v. The City Cuero237 the land owners brought a suit against
the city. The land owners contended that the city's operation of an adjacent
landfill was a nuisance and constituted inverse condemnation. The trial
court entered a take nothing judgment on the grounds that the city was im-
mune from liability in its operation of the landfill. The court held that the
city was immune from liability unless the land owners could show that the
operation of the landfill diminished the value of the adjacent property.238
Here, this was not shown and the judgment from the trial court was
affirmed. 239
In Oliver v. Oliver 24° a husband objected to a division of community prop-
erty pursuant to a divorce. He alleged that the court's action constituted a
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 77.
231. Id.
232. 746 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
233. Id. at 936.
234. 1985 Tex. Sess. Law. Service ch. 948, § 1, at 3209 (TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1970-310, since repealed).
235. 746 S.W.2d at 935.
236. Id.
237. 749 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
238. Id. at 616.
239. Id. at 618.
240. 741 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
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taking of property without due process or due compensation. The Fort
Worth court of appeals rejected both arguments.24 1
Woodson Lumber Co. v. City of College Station 242 dealt with a land owner
that sued the city and alleged inverse condemnation and denial of due pro-
cess. The land owner claimed that the city council's refusal to approve pro-
posed subdivision plats amounted to condemnation and lack of due process.
The Houston court of appeals, First District, affirmed the district court's
holding that the city council's refusal to approve a plat that attempted to
increase the density level of the area did not amount to a taking of the land
owner's property for public purposes.2 4 3 The court also held that the city
council based its decision on the belief that the area simply could not ade-
quately maintain that many people, and that the city council's failure to
disclose information considered in making its decision did not deprive the
land owner of procedural due process.
244
V. TORT LIABILITY
The current Survey period includes a number of decisions in which courts
assessed both the validity of claims for damages resulting from governmental
conduct and the propriety and scope of governmental immunity.245 In addi-
tion, a number of decisions in the Survey period addressed the police power
of local governments. This section reviews decisions of courts considering
the Texas Tort Claims Act246 and the federal cause of action for deprivation
of civil rights. 24 7
A. Liability Under 42 U.S. C. Section 1983
Several federal court decisions during the Survey period addressed claims
against municipalities under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.248 In Reid v.
Rolling Fork Public Utility District 249 the Utility District appealed a judg-
ment premised on a jury verdict that held that the Utility District had de-
nied equal protection to plaintiffs when it declined to grant a sewage
treatment commitment for a tract of land owned by plaintiffs. The Fifth
Circuit recognized that the Utility District was created by statute pursuant
to the Texas Constitution and was a conservation and reclamation dis-
241. Id. at 227.
242. 752 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1988, no writ).
243. Id. at 747.
244. Id. at 748.
245. For an outline of the scope of Texas governmental immunity, see Babcock & Collins,
Local Government Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 409, 452 (1981).
246. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001-.109 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989).
247. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
248. Id. provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
249. 854 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1988).
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trict.250 The court also recognized that when determining whether a district
decision is in agreement with the due protection clause, it is the legislative
model and not the adjudicatory model that should be followed. 251 The court
then reviewed and found clear error in the lower court's jury instruction. 252
The instruction in part was: "[t]he employment of other standards which
may not be reasonably related to the legitimate functions of [the Utility Dis-
trict] is sufficient to support a finding of a denial of equal protection under
the law."'253 After having found clear error, the court stressed that the ra-
tional basis test should have been used.254 This test, when used in conjunc-
tion with the legislative, as opposed to adjudicatory, model helps to put an
end to any second guessing by judges or juries. 255 The test set forth by the
court requires that there only be "a conceivable rational basis for the official
action. '256 Because the jury instruction was directly contrary to the law, the
court vacated the lower court judgment and remanded the action for a new
trial. 25 7
In Peoples National Utility Co. v. City of Houston 2 58 the Fifth Circuit de-
termined that federal jurisdiction would not lie in this section 1983 action
concerning the city's failure to approve the utility company's rate re-
quests. 259 The Fifth Circuit concurred with the lower court's holding that
the Johnson Act26° denies federal jurisdiction. 261 Here, the utility company
failed to establish that it did not have a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy"
in the Texas courts. 262 In doing so, the court recognized that a municipality
may set utility rates under the Public Utility Regulatory Act,263 that these
rates are reviewed under the Texas Administrative Procedure and Texas
Register Act,264 and that the Texas Legislature "intended to substitute an
adequate legal remedy for the equitable power of the court to review a rate
250. Id. at 753 (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8280-
576; and TEX. WATER CODE ANN. ch. 54 (Vernon 1955 & Supp. 1988)).
251. 854 F.2d at 753 (citing Kaplan v. Clearlake City Water Auth., 794 F.2d 1059, 1064
(5th Cir. 1986) (such districts "possess limited legislative or quasi-legislative functions");
Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 479-82 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 477
U.S. 905 (1986); Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 934-35 (5th Cir. 1988)).





257. Id. at 755.
258. 837 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1988).
259. The utility company alleged that the failure to approve the rate request was a denial of
its due process rights and resulted in an unconstitutional taking and confiscation of its prop-
erty without just compensation. Id. at 1367.
260. The Johnson Act denies federal jurisdiction when four criteria are met: "(1) Jurisdic-
tion is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of the order to the Federal Consti-
tution; and, (2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and, (3) The order has
been made after reasonable notice and hearing; and, (4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy
may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
261. 837 F.2d at 1369.
262. Id. at 1367-68.
263. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c (Vernon Supp. 1989).
264. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp. 1989).
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order on the constitutional ground of confiscation. ' 265 The court was not
persuaded by the utility company's arguments that its state remedy was no
longer available and that it need not have pursued its administrative reme-
dies before filing this section 1983 action. Regarding the first argument, the
court stated that the unavailability of the state remedy was the result of the
neglect of the utility company and not the state. 266 Regarding the second
argument, the court distinguished Patsy v. Board of Regents2 67 and held that
the Johnson Act is indicative of Congress's intent that the party bringing suit
must first avail himself of state remedies. 268
In Brawner v. City of Richardson, Texas 269 a police officer sued the city,
the police chief, and the police department director under 42 U.S.C. section
1983, contending that he was fired in retaliation for his exercise of free
speech. The officer was fired shortly after his attorney delivered a letter to
various city officials and two reporters that complained of official miscon-
duct. Defendants contended that the officer was fired because he refused to
cooperate fully in connection with their internal affairs investigation. De-
fendants' summary judgment motion, premised on their alleged qualified im-
munity, was denied. On appeal, 270 the Fifth Circuit noted that an
employee's speech does not invoke constitutional protection against dis-
charge unless that speech addresses "a matter of public concern.1 271 The
court then examined the content, form, and context of the speech and deter-
mined that the allegation of official misconduct constituted a matter of pub-
lic concern. 272 The court next went through a balancing test.273 On one
side was the state's interest in maintaining smooth running operations and
on the other side is the employee's interest in addressing issues that affect the
public. 274 Even accepting defendants' argument that the city and the police
department have an interest in conducting thorough internal affairs investi-
gations, the court concluded that such an interest is outweighed by the "pub-
lic's interest in the disclosure of misconduct or malfeasance. '275 Finally, the
265. 837 F.2d at 1368 (quoting Gulf Water Benefaction Co. v. Public Utility Comm'n, 674
F.2d 462, 467 (5th Cir. 1982)).
266. Id.
267. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
268. 837 F.2d at 1368 (citing Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Ackel, 616 F. Supp. 445, 447
(M.D. La. 1985); Miller v. N.Y.S. Public Service Comm'n, 807 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1986)
(deciding that the Johnson Act barred award of compensatory damages under § 1983)). The
court elaborated, stating that "plaintiffs may not use § 1983 as an 'end run' around the John-
son Act." 837 F.2d at 1368.
269. 855 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1988) (summary calendar).
270. To the extent that it turns on an issue of law, an appeal from a denial of the summary
judgment, premised on qualified immunity, is an appealable final decision. See Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
271. 855 F.2d at 191 (citing Noyola v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 837 F.2d 233,
237 (5th Cir. 1988)).
272. The court was persuaded that Brawner, through his attorney's letter, was speaking
about possible police misconduct and that such speech "should be classified as speech address-
ing a matter of public concern." 855 F.2d at 192.
273. Id.
274. Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
275. 855 F.2d at 192 (citing Solomon v. Royal Oak Township, 842 F.2d 862, 866 (6th Cir.
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court cautioned that "[q]ualified immunity is a defense for public officials
only if 'their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or consti-
tutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' "276 Since
the first amendment right of any employee to speak out on a matter of public
concern was clearly established at the time the letter was forwarded to the
city officials and reporters, 277 the court concluded that in a situation where
an employee was discharged for speech that concerned official misconduct, a
reasonably objective public official would have known that the discharge was
in violation of a clearly established right under the Constitution. 278 The
Fifth Circuit, therefore, affirmed the district court's denial of defendants'
summary judgment motion. 279
In Sherrell v. City of Longview280 plaintiff, by and through his guardian,
alleged that the city and several police officials deprived him of his constitu-
tional rights due to an assault by an off-duty police officer. Plaintiff claimed
that the city knew that the officer had a propensity toward violence and that
the officer had assaulted him earlier. Plaintiff also claimed that the city did
not arrest the officer in connection with the earlier assault because of a policy
that allowed officers who had been involved in an incident of domestic vio-
lence not to be arrested but rather assigned to participate in counseling. De-
fendants then moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that plaintiff failed to allege
a constitutional deprivation, failed to show how a municipal policy or cus-
tom was the moving force of the injury, or failed to show discriminatory
intent on the part of the defendants. The defendants also argued that the
plaintiff did not overcome the qualified immunity defense and did not assert
a cause of action in connection with the alleged negligent deprivation of civil
rights. Because plaintiff pled that he was the victim of a departmental policy
that favored police officers accused of domestic violence, the court con-
cluded that there was a constitutional deprivation and held that dismissal of
the claim was unwarranted. 281  The court also determined that plaintiff
properly pled sufficient facts to establish that a "special relationship" existed
between himself and defendants. 282 Because plaintiff alleged that numerous
1988)). The court added that the speech involved here, allegations of official misconduct,
could not adversely affect the proper functioning of the police department because the speech,
if true, indicated that the police department was already functioning improperly due to corrup-
tion. 855 F.2d at 192.
276. 855 F.2d at 192 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
277. 855 F.2d at 192-93 (citing Terrell v. University of Tex. System Police, 792 F.2d 1360,
1363 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986); Thomas v. Harris County, 784 F.2d 648,
653 (5th Cir. 1986); Gonzales v. Benavides, 712 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1983); Solomon v. Royal
Oak Township, 842 F.2d 862, 865 (6th Cir. 1988); O'Brien v. Town of Caledonia, 748 F.2d
403, 407 (7th Cir. 1984); Brockell v. Norton, 732 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir. 1984)).
278. 855 F.2d at 193.
279. Id. at 194.
280. 683 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
281. Here, the court noted that, "[d]iscrimination in providing protection against private
violence would of course violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 1112 (quoting Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982)).
282. 683 F. Supp. at 1113. The court noted that a "state by its acts may ... create a
'special relationship' with a specific individual, that imposes upon it a constitutional duty to
care for and protect the individual from know harms." Id. (citing Escamilla v. City of Santa
[Vol. 43
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
reports of the officer's abuse were made to police and because the police
knew of the dangers that the officer posed to plaintiff, the court concluded
that a "special relationship" and a duty to protect plaintiff may have existed
in this case and accordingly, the court denied defendants' motion to dis-
miss. 283 The court also rejected defendants' argument that plaintiff failed to
plead any facts establishing an official custom or policy other than the facts
relating to his own case. 284 While the court recognized that an official cus-
tom or policy may not be established by one act or incident carried out by an
officer, it found that plaintiff in the case at bar was injured by a number of
decisions that a number of the defendants made during the incident.285 For
example, the chief of police decided not to arrest the officer despite the re-
ports of the officer's abusive behavior. ' 286 The court did accept, however,
the defendants' argument that their allegedly negligent acts did not rise to
the level of a section 1983 violation.287 In dismissing plaintiff's negligent
deprivation of civil rights claims, the court stated that the plaintiff must
show intent to discriminate before an equal protection deprivation claim is
valid.288 The court also dismissed plaintiff's state law claims without preju-
dice to amend.289 In doing so, the court noted that plaintiff failed to allege
facts that would establish the city's limited waiver of immunity provided by
the Texas Tort Claims Act.290 The court also noted that plaintiff failed to
allege that the individual officers, otherwise shielded by sovereign immunity,
acted outside the scope of their employment. 291 Finally, the court deter-
mined that plaintiff failed properly to plead facts to overcome the qualified
immunity defense of the individual defendants. 292 Nevertheless, the court
afforded plaintiff additional time to amend his pleadings to claim that the
defendants had acted contrary to clearly established law.293
Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 268-70 (9th Cir. 1986); Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 782
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503,
510-11 (3d Cir. 1985); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 191-94 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1052 (1985); Bowers v. De Vito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)).
283. 683 F. Supp. at 1114. The court noted that Texas law reflects a special concern for the
plight of abused children, as here, and imposes duties upon state officials to receive and investi-
gate child abuse complaints. Id. The court also noted that defendants' knowledge of the of-
ficer's propensity toward violence further indicated that a duty to protect plaintiff may have
existed in this case. Id.
284. Id. at 1118.
285. Id. at 1114-15.
286. Id. at 1115. The court further found that an inference of city policy was raised by the
repeated refusal of the city to arrest the officer in response to plaintiff's complaints.
287. Id. at 1116-17.
288. Id. at 1116. In so stating, the court relied upon Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986), overruling in part Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); and Davidson v. Cannon, 474
U.S. 344 (1986). See also Love v. King, 784 F.2d 708, 712-13 (5th Cir. 1986); NAHMOD, CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION §§ 3.02, 3.09 (2d ed. 1986).
289. 683 F. Supp. at 1117.
290. Id. at 1118.
291. Id. at 1117.
292. Id. at 1118.
293. Id. at 1117.
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B. Liability Under Texas Tort Claims Act
The Texas courts of appeals rendered several decisions of note during the
Survey period construing the Texas Tort Claims Act. In two decisions, Hill
v. Bellville General Hospital2 94 and Bourne v. Nueces County Hospital Dis-
trict,2 9 5 courts of appeals interpreted the scope of the notice provisions of the
Texas Tort Claims Act. In Hill the parents of a stillborn baby appealed a
summary judgment granted in favor of the county hospital. The county hos-
pital argued that plaintiffs failed to provide it with notice of their claim
within six months of the occurrence as required by the Texas Tort Claims
Act.296 The court recognized that an exception to this requirement exists if
"the governmental unit has actual notice that the death has occurred, that
the claimant has received some injury, or that the claimant's property has
been damaged. ' 297 After examining the summary judgment evidence, in-
cluding evidence of the hospital's investigative report of the incident and
evidence that a determination was made by hospital officials regarding the
cause of death, the court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact
existed with respect to the issue of actual notice.2 98 Accordingly, the court
reversed the summary judgment in favor of the county hospital and re-
manded the action to the trial court.299
In Bourne plaintiff's schizophrenic brother, who was released from con-
finement by the county hospital, set fire to plaintiff's home, causing the
death of plaintiff's husband and young daughter. The trial court granted
summary judgment to the hospital because, inter alia, plaintiff failed to pro-
vide the hospital with notice of her claims as required by the Texas Tort
Claims Act.300 Plaintiff argued, as did the plaintiff in Hill, that the hospital
had actual notice of her claim. She asserted that the emergency room
records reflect that a house fire caused her injuries as well as the death of her
husband and daughter. The court of appeals disagreed, noting that the hos-
pital records contained no indication that the hospital was in any way re-
sponsible for the fire. 30  The court also noted that the records failed to
establish that the appellant had an intent to file suit against the hospital. 30 2
The court further held that it would be unreasonable to conclude that the
hospital had actual notice from the records alone.30 3 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the trial court judgment.304
294. 735 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
295. 749 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
296. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101 (Vernon 1986).
297. 735 S.W.2d at 677 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(c) (Vernon
1986)). The court added that the actual notice exception "means that the governmental entity
received the knowledge that it would have received if the appellants had complied with the
formal notice requirements." 735 S.W.2d at 677 (citing Collier v. City of Texas City, 598
S.W.2d 356, 358 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ) (emphasis in original)).
298. 735 S.W.2d at 677.
299. Id. at 678.




304. Id. at 633.
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In other decisions courts of appeals interpreted the scope of the Texas
Tort Claims Act provisions waiving governmental immunity. 305 In Bourne
the court recognized that the Texas Tort Claims Act provides for a "waiver
of governmental immunity in three general areas: use of publicly owned
vehicles, premise defects, and injuries arising from a condition or use of
property. '' 30 6 Plaintiff argued that her action fell within the waiver relating
to injuries arising from a use of property. Plaintiff argued that the hospital's
failure to use its building to confine her schizophrenic brother caused her
injuries as well as the death of her husband and daughter. The court re-
jected plaintiff's argument and noted that "the limited waiver of governmen-
tal immunity does not extend to 'non-use' of property. ' 30 7 Accordingly, the
court concluded that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action within the
Act's waiver provisions.
In McCord v. Memorial Medical Center Hospital,30 8 plaintiff sued a hospi-
tal because of injuries he allegedly suffered when the hospital security guard
assaulted him.309 At trial, the hospital obtained summary judgment based
upon governmental immunity. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the use of
the night stick by the security guard was an act for which the legislature
waived immunity. The court disagreed, noting that the waiver of govern-
mental immunity, as alleged by plaintiff, is limited by section 101.057,3 10
which specifically provides that claims "arising out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, or any other intentional tort" are not actionable. 311 Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the hospital.312
In Trevathan v. State313 the plaintiff asserted a tort claim against the State
of Texas when she was attacked during a camping trip at a state park. The
trial court granted summary judgment to the state because of the state's sov-
ereign immunity. The plaintiff's primary argument centered around the
contention that the state failed to provide adequate security, which proxi-
mately caused her tortious injuries. The court of appeals concluded that the
plaintiff's claim fell within the statutory provision providing that the state is
immune for "[any] claim based on an injury or death connected with any act
or omission ... arising out of the failure to provide, or the method of provid-
ing, police or fire protection. ' 31 4 Accordingly, it affirmed the trial court
305. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1986).
306. 749 S.W.2d at 632 (citing Salcedo v. El Paso Hospital Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex.
1983)).
307. 749 S.W.2d at 632 (citing Seiler v. Guadalupe Valley Hospital, 709 S.W.2d 37, 38
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Floyd v. Willacy County Hospital Dist.,
706 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Vela v. Cameron
County, 703 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
308. 750 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
309. In addition, plaintiff alleged causes of action for false imprisonment, malicious prose-
cution, and negligent hiring and supervision of employees.
310. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.057(2) (Vernon 1986); see also Townsend
v. Memorial Medical Center, 529 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
311. 750 S.W.2d at 363.
312. Id. at 364.
313. 740 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ dism'd).
314. Id. at 502; TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.055 (Vernon 1986).
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judgment. The court went on to note that claims arising out of an assault or
any other intentional tort are excluded under the Texas Tort Claims Act 1 5
and that constitutional challenges to the statutory grant of immunity from
liability consistently have been rejected.3 16
VI. POLICE POWER
During the Survey period, a number of courts addressed the constitution-
ality of city ordinances that regulate the operation of sexually oriented busi-
nesses. In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas.317 the Fifth Circuit held that a
Dallas city ordinance (the Ordinance) 3 18 that imposed certain licensing and
zoning restrictions upon sexually oriented businesses withstood constitu-
tional challenges. 3 19 Plaintiffs, the owners and operators of sexually oriented
businesses, argued that the licensing scheme of the Ordinance regulated the
content of expression protected by the first amendment. Relying upon
Freedman v. Maryland320 and Fernandes v. Limmer,32 1 plaintiffs argued
that the Ordinance lacked procedural due process protection and, therefore,
was unconstitutional. The majority concluded that the licensing scheme of
the Ordinance was not content-based regulation and refused to apply the
analysis under Freedman and Fernandes. Rather, the court followed the
analysis under City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 32 2 in which the
Supreme Court characterized a Washington ordinance that prohibited cer-
tain locations of adult motion picture theatres as a time, place, or manner
restriction. 32 3 The court was persuaded that the Dallas Ordinance, like the
315. 740 S.W.2d at 502 (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.055). The
court went on to state that "courts generally are not in the business of reviewing policy deci-
sions that governments must make in deciding how much, if any, police protection to provide
for a community and, in this case, the park community." 740 S.W.2d at 502 (citing State v.
Terrell, 588 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. 1979)).
316. 704 S.W.2d at 502 (citing Lynch v. Port of Houston Auth., 671 S.W.2d 954 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Duson v. Midland County Indep. School
Dist., 627 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ); Swafford v. City of Garland,
491 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
317. 837 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988).
318. The Ordinance requires that:
A business must be at least 1000 feet from another sexually oriented business or
a church, school, residential area, or park. Such businesses must also obtain a
license issued by the Chief of Police and permit inspection of their premises
when open or occupied. A license is not available to persons formerly convicted
of specified crimes, such as promotion of prostitution. The Ordinance also re-
quires that viewing rooms in adult theatres be configured to allow visual surveil-
lance by management.
837 F.2d at 1300.
319. Judge Thornberry dissented in part to the majority opinion.
320. 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (Maryland statute preventing distribution or exhibition of films
unapproved by Board of Censors held unconstitutional for lack of procedural due process
protection).
321. 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1124 (1982) (regulation of
Dallas Fort Worth Airport authority denying followers of Krishna religion license to solicit at
airport held unconstitutional for lack of procedural due process protection).
322. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
323. 837 F.2d at 1302. The court noted that the Supreme Court "found the first amend-
ment satisfied because the city had a substantial interest in regulating sexually oriented busi-
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Washington ordinance, regulated only the secondary effects of sexually ori-
ented businesses and did not constitute regulation of particular speech. 324
Because the city of Dallas demonstrated that the Ordinance furthered a sub-
stantial government interest, that of maintaining the qualify of urban life,
and because the city of Dallas offered evidence that alternative, feasible loca-
tions existed for such businesses, the court determined that the Ordinance
met the standards applicable to time, place, and manner restrictions. 325
Dissenting in part, Judge Thornberry disagreed with the majority's char-
acterization of the licensing scheme as a content-neutral time, place, and
manner regulation. Arguing that Fernandes was indistinguishable, he noted
that the ordinance in Fernandes was also ostensibly content-neutral because
it purported to prohibit interference with people moving through the airport
and to help the flow of pedestrian traffic. 326 Further, he argued that City of
Renton, the decision relied upon by the majority, was distinguishable be-
cause it involved a zoning ordinance that allowed alternative avenues of
communications. 327 He also argued that the licensing scheme of the Dallas
Ordinance resulted in a greater impact on speech than zoning ordinances
because zoning allows other avenues of communication. Conversely, he ar-
gued, denying a license results in a total ban on speech.
Several courts of appeals also addressed and upheld the constitutionality
of ordinances similar to the Dallas Ordinance. 328 In Lindsay v. Papage-
orgiou 32 9 the court of appeals reviewed and reversed a district court opinion
nesses and did so without restricting alternative avenues of communication." Id. (citing City
of Renton, 106 S. Ct. at 930-32).
324. "What is being limited here is not a particular movie, as in Freedman, nor episodic
solicitation efforts, as in Fernandes, but a long term commercial business." 837 F.2d at 1303.
The court also noted that even though particular procedural protections are not immediately
provided, the "ongoing nature of the regulation provides a strong incentive for the business
operators to seek review of licensing decisions." Id.
325. The majority also rejected licenses to persons convicted of certain crimes. In so doing,
the court questioned the appropriate standard upon which to measure such regulation:
While compelling necessity might be a proper standard to measure regulation
disabling a person with full participatory rights of citizenship, on balance we are
persuaded that only a substantial relationship need be shown between the con-
viction and the evil sought to be prevented. The courts have not engaged in
such strict scrutiny and have not otherwise required compelling necessity to jus-
tify other occupational bars attending a criminal conviction, including those
laced with activity protected by the first amendment such as labor organizing.
In short, the City need only show that conviction and the evil to be regulated
bear a substantial relationship.
837 F.2d at 1305. The court concluded that the Ordinance was "well tailored to sufficiently
achieve its ends." Id.
326. Id. at 1308.
327. Id. at 1309.
328. Other decisions have upheld the constitutionality of similar ordinances in the face of
challenges that such ordinances are unconstitutionally vague, overboard, violative of due pro-
cess, preempted by state law, or in conflict with certain state laws. Martinez v. State, 744
S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ). But cf. City of Houston v.
Mitchell, 737 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (dictum indicating
that city may not enforce ordinance relating to lighting and structural configuration of adult
arcades by injunction pursuant to § 2(2) of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1175f (Vernon
Supp. 1987)).
329. 751 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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that declared certain Harris County regulations, which governed the loca-
tion of sexually oriented enterprises, unconstitutional. Appellants persuaded
the court of appeals that the standards set forth in City of Renton applied
because the Harris County regulations do not forbid sexually oriented com-
mercial enterprises completely, but rather prohibit their existence within a
prescribed distance of enumerated land uses. 330 The court then concluded
that the record demonstrated that the regulations served a substantial gov-
ernment interest 331 and that the regulations allowed for reasonable avenues
of communication. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Harris
County regulations withstood the first amendment challenge. 3
32
In Rahmani v. State333 the operator of an adult arcade was convicted in
municipal court for operating the arcade without a permit that the Houston
City Code (the Ordinance) required. The operator appealed his conviction,
challenging the constitutionality of the Ordinance provision requiring that
arcades be configured to provide an unobstructed view of every area within
the arcade. 334 The court of appeals rejected this challenge. 335 The court
then relied upon the time, place, and manner test set out in City ofRenton 3 36
and concluded that the Ordinance was sufficiently well-tailored to address
the secondary effects of adult arcades and that it left open ample alternative
channels for communication.3 37
330. Id. at 549.
331. Id. The court noted, "concern with the adverse secondary effect of the unrestricted
location of the enterprises on the public health, safety, and welfare by their contribution to the
decline of residential and business neighbors and the growth of criminal activity .... "
332. Id. at 550 ("the regulations in question impose only a minimal or incidental burden on
protected expression, as they are nothing more than a limitation on the place where such
expression may be exercised .... ").
333. 748 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988, no writ).
334. The operator argued that such a requirement impermissibly infringed upon protected
speech.
335. 748 S.W.2d at 621 (quoting People v. B & I News, Inc., 164 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 6,
211 Cal. Rptr. 346, 349 (1984)). The court stated:
No restriction is imposed upon access to the arcade, nor upon the content of the
film. The Ordinance does not require the use of fewer arcade devices, limit the
number of persons viewing the films, nor reduce the number of film titles that
may be shown. The Ordinance "merely requires conformity to its provisions for
a visible interior".
Id.
336. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, (1986).
337. 748 S.W.2d at 622. The court also concluded that "[tIhe only actual effect of this
Ordinance is that patrons of adult arcades will be required to peruse openly, under specified
minimum lighting, the entertainment provided." Id.
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